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The study of American state legislatures in political 
science literature is a relatively recent endeavor. The number 
of studies has increased in recent years and in 1967 Charles W. 
Wiggins argued that they would continue, partly due to the 
effects of reapportionment.1 A number of these past analyses 
have examined the role of political parties in a state's legisla­
tive process.
The purpose of this paper is to ascertain the importance of 
political parties in voting within the North Dakota legislative 
system. Primary emphasis will be on voting which relates to 
finance and tax legislation. The discussion will be concerned 
with the frequency of party voting in the finance and tax 
committee, the degree of party cohesion, and the fiscal issues 
that tend to divide North Dakota legislators along party lines.
An analysis of the impact of partisanship on North Dakota public 
finance policies will also be considered.
The object of this paper is to study the role of political 
parties in finance and tax legislation in the 1987 session of the 
North Dakota legislature and the implications for public policy­
making. A discussion of previous state legislative research will 
prove helpful to set the stage for the analysis of the North
Dakota case. The subject areas that are relevant to this study 
include the role of political parties, public policy issues that 
tend to elicit partisan voting responses, the role of committees 
and party leaders, the significance of cues in voting behavior, 
and the role of the governor in the legislative process. Each of 
these will be discussed in turn.
Political Parties
This section will acquaint the reader with the basic views 
and philosophies of the Democratic and Republican parties. 
Obviously, these parties tailor their policies to the local 
conditions of each state. North Dakota is no exception. This 
discussion should help to highlight North Dakota's political 
parties and how they compare with the national parties. As will 
be seen shortly, due to this state's relatively homogeneous 
population, the state parties cannot be considered mirror images 
of their national counterparts.
The Democratic and Republican parties are highly visible in 
state politics. In fact, the political scientist Sarah McCally 
Morehouse has stated:
The single most important factor in state politics is 
the political party. It is not possible to understand 
the difference in the way sovereign states carry out 
the process of government without understanding the 
type of party whose representatives are making deci­
sions that affect the health, education, and welfare of 
its citizens.2
Years ago, the prominent political scientist, V.O. Key, distin­
guished between a few states in which the parties resembled a
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"responsible model" and the many others in which party labels 
were meaningless. The "responsible" party system can be 
described as a system in which the two parties present clear, 
alternative programs during the election. As a result, the 
electorate can hold the party responsible for the public policies 
which are subsequently implemented.
In reality however, the degree of party competition among 
the several states varies considerably. Thus, some states are 
"one-party" states where one political party consistently 
dominates the legislature. Indeed, this has been true especially 
in the South where the Republican party is virtually nonexistent. 
Even today, the Republican party in this region "frequently fails 
to run candidates for state and local offices."3 Other states 
may be termed "competitive two-party or simply "two-party". In 
states characterized as two-party, the "voters... use party labels 
to help them identify the politics of candidates."4
It is interesting to note the reasons for the varying levels 
of party competition in the states. History has dictated much in 
this respect. The slavery of blacks was a principal cause of the 
one-party nature of the South. The Republican party was founded 
in 1854 to resist the spread of slavery and the majority of white 
southerners were Democrats before the Civil War. After the war, 
the South witnessed the freeing of their slaves as well as a 
military occupation by the North. In response to this the South 
remained Democratic since "one-partyism is characteristic of 
political systems in which large numbers of people are united in
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opposition to a perceived serious threat."5 The one-party nature 
of southern politics effectively barred blacks from political 
participation for many years.
However, this explanation does not explain the lack of party 
competition in other states. The political scientist, Thomas Dye 
maintains that "party competition...appears to be closely related 
to socioeconomic conditions in the states"6 with more party 
competition in urban industrial states "in which the parties 
represent separate socioeconomic constituencies."7 The rural 
states tend to have a more homogeneous population and Dye argues 
that this does not effectively produce enough social divisions to 
support a competitive two-party system.
V.O. Key has warned against confusing the role of state 
political parties with that of the national party system. 
According to Key, "It is an error to assume that the political 
parties of each state are but miniatures of the national party 
system. In a few states this condition is approached, but...each 
state has its own pattern of action..."8 Nationally, the 
Democratic party "receives a disproportionate amount of support 
from Catholics and Jews; blacks; lower educational and income 
groups; younger people; union members; and big-city residents."9 
In contrast, the Republican party receives more of the white, 
higher-educated protestant vote; non-union workers; and the rural 
vote.
As Key has mentioned, these observations rarely hold true 
for the states. The differences between the two parties in
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states are quite unique when it comes to their respective
approach to policy issues. This makes sense conceptually when
one considers the differences in the state electorates. The
state parties fail to mirror their national counterparts in
states that are relatively homogeneous. As Dye explains:
...the Democratic party does not fully reflect the 
views of labor groups, Catholic voters, and racial and 
ethnic minorites in those... states that do not have 
large numbers of these kinds of voters.10
On the other hand, parties in the larger, industrial states tend 
to exhibit more of the tendencies of the national parties, 
especially when the state's parties represent separate socio­
economic constituencies. This diversification of views in the 
constituency causes the parties to disagree more over issues such 
as taxation and welfare spending - the same issues that tend to 
divide the national parties.
Despite these differences "national party affiliations...do 
affect voting in state elections." H  Andrew Cowart, in a study 
of state electoral choice, found that people who identify 
themselves as a Democrat tend to vote that way in state as well 
as national elections. This same consistency was found with 
Republican voters.12
Partisan Issues
Discovering which issues elicit partisan responses is by no 
means clear-cut and identifying such issues among the states may 
require an in-depth study "since the degree of partisan conflict
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will depend upon the policy area in question and upon the nature 
of the state political and legislative system."13 This 
discussion should help to reveal how closely partisan issues in 
the North Dakota legislature approximate the areas that Malcolm 
Jewell sees as partisan. Jewell, in a study of party voting in 
eight state legislatures, attempted to ascertain issues that 
elicited partisan responses. Jewell concluded that the most 
significant partisan issues as determined by roll call votes fell 
into three areas:
1. Those which involve rather narrow party interests- 
election laws and the legislature;
2. Those which involve the basic policy and prestige 
of the administration and are therefore sensitive to 
party pressure-appropriations, taxes, and appointments; 
and
3. Those which involve social and economic issues...- 
labor, welfare, and most national issues.14
However, a word of caution is in order. Malcolm Jewell and
Samuel Patterson note that party alignment may be weaker in
Congress when compared to some state legislatures. The reason
may be that "the congressional parties represent a much more
diverse collection of districts than is found in state
legislative parties."15
When an absence of party voting exists, other factors may 
determine the patterns of roll call voting. Glen T. Broach 
studied various legislative sessions in Alabama, Tennessee, Iowa 
and Indiana. With respect to conflicts among urban/rural 
legislators, he found division over issues relating to property 
tax, apportionment, and alcohol regulation. These areas he
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termed "issue specific". Broach concluded that "urban and rural 
legislators consistently oppose each other only on a rather 
limited number of issues which clearly affect urban and rural 
interests differently. An excellent example of an issue 
causing an urban/rural split in the North Dakota legislative 
session was HB 1291. This legislation would have allowed 
nonresidents of a city that imposes a city sales tax to be exempt 
from that tax. This vote was clearly split between urban and 
rural legislators both at the committee and full House level.
Committees and Party Leaders
Other legislative institutions may influence party voting or 
function as alternative voting cues. For example, committees 
play an important role in the legislative process.
The function of committees at the national and state level 
is to reduce the legislative workload "by providing for a 
division of labor among legislators."17 In his book on state 
legislatures, Jewell noted several reasons "why state legislative 
committees are but pale shadows of their congressional counter­
parts. nl8 Although an increasing number of state legislatures 
now meet annually, it is still for only a few months. This 
deprives them of effectively reviewing legislation. The commit­
tees also lack adequate staff assistance. Indeed, only a few 
states have individual office space for their legislators coupled 
with full-time staff assistance. Unfortunately most legislators 
think of their job as part-time; therefore, turnover is consid­
erably higher than the U.S. Congress. The part-time nature of
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the job also denies legislators the opportunity to develop 
expertise in specific areas, a goal every congressional legisla­
tor strives for. As a result, one could maintain that state 
legislative committees are inferior to their congressional 
counterparts since "a basic purpose of legislative committees is 
to permit specialization."1  ̂ Clearly, the majority of state 
legislatures fail to achieve this.
It is true that the North Dakota legislature is only part- 
time and that their committees are, as Jewell states, inferior to 
their congressional counterparts. This weakness of the committee 
system in the state legislature may be a reason why there is 
party voting on several aspects of legislation. The legislator 
may feel that the committee has not provided the expertise 
necessary to make a sound decision when voting. Therefore, party 
becomes more influential on the direction of a vote.
The failure of legislative specialization in the states may 
be remedied in part by party leaders. Research seems to suggest 
that legislators may look to their party leaders for advice on 
legislation that they are not sure of. Other reference points 
are committee chairs, provided that they have served in that 
capacity for several legislative sessions.
The role of party leaders in legislative committees may vary 
in each state. They make chair appointments and committee 
assignments, although in the House this power is shared with the 
speaker. This provides a contrast to that of Congress where 
"seniority norms greatly restrict party leadership decisions."2^
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Naturally, the influence of party leaders on the outcome of 
legislation varies and this influence may be curtailed in states 
with divided party control.
In North Dakota, the party leaders are quite effective at 
their role. For example, they provide assistance to their caucus 
by explaining the issues to their members in such a way that 
these legislators may make an intelligent decision when voting. 
Again, the influence of the party leader in North Dakota may be a 
reason for party voting on finance and tax legislation.
Voting Cues
The process by which any legislator derives at a decision is
dependent upon several sources or cues. At times, it may be a
combination of cues. In the North Dakota legislature there is
likewise a combination of cues affecting a legislator's vote.
The role of party as one of these cues undeniably exists.
However, it is difficult to know how influential the role of
party is as a voting cue due to the multiplicity of cues which
exist in any legislative session.
Jewell and Patterson have noted that a study of roll call
votes will reveal how legislators vote but fails to tell why they
voted a certain way.21 Additionally, John Kingdon argues that:
...nearly all roll call studies have discovered the 
central importance of political parties in the 
explanation of political cleavage. Yet we know little 
about the process by which the party influences its 
congressmen. Party voting may be a function of some 
constituency factor, coalition support of different 
kinds, sanctions employed by legislative leaders, 
administration pressure, cue giving within the
9
Congress, ideological similarity among fellow party 
members, and other possible factors, or various 
combinations of them.22
According to Kingdon's model of decision-making, the first 
question a legislator asks is whether there is any controversy 
about the issue. If not, then the decision is relatively simple. 
However, if considerable controversy exists then the legislator 
will turn to other sources for help and advice. These other 
sources may include groups for whom the issue is particularly 
salient, such as lobbyists and interest groups. Legislators will 
be more inclined to follow the views of trusted colleagues who 
represent districts similar to their own.
A study of state legislative decision-making was conducted 
by Eric Uslaner and Ronald Weber. They surveyed 1,256 state 
legislators and asked them to rank their five most important 
sources of information from 13 possible responses. The results 
showed that legislators relied most heavily upon personal friends 
as cue givers. "Over half the members cite personal friends and 
committee leaders as important sources of information in helping 
them decide on whether to support or oppose a bill."23
In terms of a nonlegislative cue giver, interest groups were 
mentioned most frequently, comprising approximately 40 percent of 
the respondents. Uslaner and Weber maintain that the two sources 
of cues as given above closely resemble the Congress in terms of 
importance for legislators. In contrast, the authors found that 
legislative party leadership was more significant as a cue source 
in the states. This fact relates to the role of party leadership
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in the North Dakota legislature. As previously mentioned, due to 
its weakened committee system, the role of party leadership as a 
cue source becomes more influential. By contrast, the role of 
party leader in Congress is somewhat restricted due to the norm 
of seniority.24
In the North Dakota legislature, it is difficult to know how 
precise the role of party, other legislators, the governor, or 
interest groups are on an individual legislator's decision.
For example, there were several groups of lobbyists representing 
many interest groups attemping to influence the state's lawmakers 
on the legislation raising the sales tax. In addition, the 
legislators had to consider their own constituencies.
It is important to realize that the exchange of information 
that results from the process of cue giving and taking does not 
serve as a unidimensional explanation for legislative decision­
making. There are simply too many variables that enter into any 
policy issue and it would appear that policies continue to grow 
more varied and complex.
A more intriguing aspect of this study relates to the role 
of the chief executive as a cue giver. Uslaner and Weber found 
that only 1.4 percent of their respondents considered the 
governor as a primary cue giver. This is surprising since "the 
literature on state policy formation has stressed the importance 
of the role of governor... to even a greater extent than that of 
the president in Congress (Sharkansky 1968; McCally 1966)."2^
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Role of the Governor
The governor, as party leader, clearly affects the voting 
behavior of legislators. The legislators who belong to the 
governor's party will often follow their chief executive's wishes 
on important legislation. The opposition party will likewise 
oppose legislation which bears the governor's mark. Thus, the 
governor is influential in terms of party voting. There are 
several roles the governor of any state plays including chief 
administrator, chief legislator, party leader, and various 
ceremonial roles. These roles equally apply to North Dakota. For 
purposes of this paper, consideration will be given to the 
governor's legislative powers and the role as party leader.
Formal Legislative Powers
A number of formal legislative powers are conferred upon 
every state governor including periodic reports outlining the 
affairs of the state. This resembles the president's state of 
the union address. During the governor's message he will take 
the initiative and set the agenda for the programs he wishes to 
pursue. This is an important advantage for the governor since by 
setting the agenda "legislators are on the defensive; if they do 
not act, they must explain why."26 Related to this is the 
governor's control over the state budget. Clearly, this is the 
governor's most formidable power and often "it is the most hotly 
contested issue in a legislative session."27
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The right to call a special session is another formal power. 
The governor's power to specify the topics to be considered 
coupled with the threat to call a session may compel legislators 
to act on his program(s) rather than be called back to the state 
capitol - a situation which many would not like.
Indeed, these facts closely relate to the past legislative 
session in North Dakota. The governor's budget, as submitted, 
was definitely contested, especially by the Republican party. 
Furthermore, the governor had called a special session the month 
before the regular session and specified that the topic to be 
acted on would be the budget deficit. Thus, when the governor 
took a stand on an issue, the level of party voting increased.
A governor's influence may also be negative. Indeed, Jewell 
argues that "his negative authority is massive"28 since governors 
enjoy virtual monopoly power over their use of the veto. Only 
North Carolina prohibits the power of veto to its governor. The 
veto power works to a governor's advantage in still another way. 
Since many legislative bills are passed near the end of a 
session, the governor may simply veto a bill after legislative 
adjournment, thus assuring the bill's demise.
Role as Party Leader
The formal powers of a governor remain easy to outline but 
the powers of his role as party leader are not so clear. Much 
depends on the strength of the two parties in each state. 
Generally speaking, if a state is characterized by a strong two- 
party system, the legislators who belong to the governor's party
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will be more inclined to remain loyal to his programs and wishes 
since they may feel that their own reelection depends on the 
governor's victory at the polls. Two-party competition is 
related to the norms of partisanship "although it alone is no 
guarantee of consistently high cohesion in roll call voting."29
States characterized as one-party obviously do not have the 
extent of party competition exemplified by two-party states. As 
Thomas Dye has said, "in terms of legislative behavior, one-party 
states are really no party states."30 a s a result, partisan 
norms are negligible or non-existent. Therefore a governor in 
such a state "must rely upon personal organizations or factional 
support."31
The fact that a governor may not influence a one-party 
dominated legislature does not necessarily tarnish his electoral 
image. The governor, like the president, enjoys extensive media 
coverage thereby allowing him to influence public opinion on 
issues he deems important. No individual legislator enjoys this 
privilege. Above all, the role of governor is that of 
persuasion - persuading their administrators, party leaders, 
individual legislators, and, ultimately the public. Admittedly, 
this is no easy task especially when one considers that "the 
public expects governors to take the lead in solving state 
problems."32 jn North Dakota, the state faced a severe problem 
as there was a projected $27 million deficit in the general fund. 
The governor subsequently called a special session to deal with 
that problem. This action suggests that a further role of the
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governor is that of initiator of public policy. The bureaucrat 
and the interest group may also be considered in this categori­
zation and it is "these elements that develop policy proposals in 
the first instance..." 33 jn contrast, the role of the legisla­
ture is that of "responding to the stimulus provided by these 
groups."34
This research provides a framework to place the 1987 session 
of the North Dakota legislature into perspective. That is, this 
information should help the reader more clearly see how the 1987 
session illustrates various forces in the legislative process.
As noted earlier, there are certain issues which cause 
partisan divisions. One of these is the area of taxation. 
Therefore, this paper will be concerned with the various taxation 
issues which were before the 1987 session. Following is a 
discussion of the major tax legislation undertaken accompanied by 
a brief sketch of the members of the House Finance and Tax 
Committee.
N.D. Legislative Overview 
Major Tax Legislation
When the legislature meets in its biennial session, it 
approves a budget to meet the state's fiscal needs for a two-year 
period. Taxes are clearly the most important source of state 
income and several types are used by the state for public 
finance. The taxes to be considered in this study include the 
sales, severance tax, coal conversion, and the income tax.
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Sales tax. As is true for most states, North Dakota derives
a significant portion of its general fund revenue from the sales 
tax. As Table 1 shows, it is expected to amount to approximately 
$506 million in the 1987-89 biennium.35 The general sales tax 
rate was increased to five and one-half percent, three and one- 
half percent on farm machinery, and six and one-half percent on 
the retail sales of alcoholic beverages. In addition, a city may 
elect to adopt a home rule charter allowing them to levy an 
additional tax. To date, Bismarck, Grand Forks, and Minot assess 
a one percent city sales tax.
Table 1
Estimated Revenue 1987-89
Sales and use tax $505,379,000 48%
Corporate and individual 
Severance taxes
income taxes 272,897,000 26%
Oil and gas production $40,699, 000
Oil extraction 59,705, 000
Coal severance 18,647, 000 119,051,000 11%
Cigarette and tobacco tax 28,063,000 3%
Coal conversion tax 16,348,000 2%
Insurance premium tax 31,660,000 3%
Wholesale liquor tax 10,448,000 1%
Business privilege tax 3,522,000 -
Departmental fees and collections 20,837,000 2%
Interest, income 15,681,000 2%
Mineral leasing fees 13,379,000 1%
Bank of North Dakota 12,000,000 1%
State Mill and Elevator 3,000,000 -
Gas tax administration 835,000 -
Veteran's Post War Trust Fund 2,000,000 -
Total general fund revenue $1,055,100,000
Severance Tax
A severance tax is a tax imposed on the act of "severing" a 
certain mineral from the soil. North Dakota levies three types
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of severance taxes: the coal severance tax, the oil and gas 
production tax, and the oil extraction tax.
Coal severance tax. The coal severance tax is a tax imposed 
on the removal of coal from the ground. There are certain 
exceptions, however. Coal used for heating state buildings and 
coal used in agricultural processing is exempt from the tax.36 
The 1987 session reduced the coal severance tax rate to seventy- 
five cents per ton (plus a two cent special research tax) . The 
distribution of this revenue is as follows:
* 15% to the trust fund for loans to local governments.
* 35% to the coal producing counties. Within each county, 
the revenue is divided in the following manner:
40% to the county 
30% to the cities 
30% to the schools
* 50% goes to the state general fund.37
Oil and gas production tax. In the early 1950s, the 
legislature created the gross production tax at a rate of four 
and one-quarter percent. However, the revenue from this tax was 
insignificant until the price of world oil began to increase. 
Estimated revenue from this tax was severely curtailed again in 
1986 due to the drop in world oil prices. To be more precise, in 
just two months, "the price paid for oil produced in the... 
Williston Basin and elsewhere fell from $28 per barrel to $12 per 
barrel."38 Currently, the rate is five percent of the gross 
value at the well of all oil and gas produced.
Oil extraction tax. This tax was instigated in 1980 by an 
initiated measure and imposes a six and one-half percent extrac­
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tion tax on oil. This is in addition to the five percent oil and 
gas production tax. The expected revenue from this source for 
the 1987-89 biennium is about $60 million (Table 1). 90 percent 
of this revenue goes to the state general fund while the remain­
ing ten percent goes to a trust fund. As an incentive for 
further oil exploration and production, the legislature has given 
tax breaks to new wells. Thus, new wells will receive a fifteen 
month "holiday" from the tax with a reduced rate of four percent 
after the fifteen months expire.39
Coal conversion tax. In the 1975 session, the legislature 
enacted the coal conversion facility tax due to the increased 
lignite development. The tax covers the process of converting 
coal to another form of energy. The tax rate is placed on the 
following two types of facilities.
1) Coal gasification plants: two and one-half percent of 
gross receipts or seven cents per one thousand cubic feet of gas, 
whichever is larger.
2) Electrical generating plants: one-fourth of one mill on 
each kilowatt of electricity generated and one-fourth of one mill 
times sixty percent of plant capacity.
Revenues are divided between the state and local governments 
at a rate of sixty-five percent to the state general fund and 
thirty-five percent to the counties.
Income tax. The income tax on corporations and individuals 
wTithin the state is expected to produce around $273 million for 
the 1987-89 biennium (Table 1). The current state tax laws
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mandate that all residents must file a North Dakota income tax 
return if their annual gross income is $4,400 or more. The 
amount is $5,650 for individuals over sixty-five.40 There are 
two options available for calculating personal income taxes.
These include the short and long form. The short form is used by 
approximately 90 percent of the taxpayers and the income tax 
liability is determined by multiplying the adjusted federal 
income tax liability by 14 percent. Those choosing the long form 
are required to use a rate table at the following current 
amounts:
Individual Income Tax
Up to 3,000 at 2.67%.
3.001 to 5,000.......$60 plus 4% in excess of $3,000.
5.001 to 8,000.......$120 plus 5.33% in excess of $5,000.
8.001 to 15,000.......$240 plus 6.67% in excess of 8,000.
15.001 to 25,000.......$590 plus 8% in excess of $15,000.
25.001 to 35,000........$1,190 plus 9.33% in excess of $25,000.
35.001 to 50,000........$1,890 plus 10.67% in excess of $35,000 .
Over 50,000 ....... $3,090 plus 12% in excess of $50,000.
Regardless of the option used, all taxpayers must pay an 
additional ten percent surtax for the 1987 taxable year.4i-
Corporate income tax. According to state tax laws, every 
corporation engaged in business in North Dakota or having a 
source of income in the state must file a corporate tax return.
A corporation begins its tax computation with the federal taxable 
income. Their net income is then derived by adjusting the 
federal taxable income. Finally, the North Dakota taxable income 
is "the amount of income to which the rates are applied,...that 
portion of a corporation's net income which is derived from or 
attributable to sources within North Dakota."4^
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A corporation may engage in business solely within this 
state or it may elect to conduct business both within and without 
North Dakota. If a corporation engages in the latter method it 
"is an apportioning corporation and its North Dakota taxable 
income is computed by multiplying its net income by an apportion­
ment f a c t o r . A t  times, two or more corporations may conduct 
the same business. If this is the case, the corporations will 
prepare a combined unitary report. To further elaborate:
A unitary business is one where the activities depend 
upon, contribute to, or are integrated with each other.
Two or more affiliated corporations may conduct a 
unitary business. Corporations are affiliated when 
more than 50% of the voting stock of each is owned 
directly or indirectly by the same interests. The 
combined report includes the total net (apportionable) 
income; i.e., federal taxable income plus or minus 
statutory adjustments, of all members of the unitary 
group.44
The 1937 session did not change the corporate income tax rates 
and they are as follows:4^
Corporate Income Tax Rates
Up to $3,000.......................... 3.0%
$ 3,000 to 8,000...... $ 90. plus 4.5% of excess over $ 3,000.
$ 8,000 to 20,000...... $ 315. plus 6.0% of excess over $ 8,000.
$20,000 to 30,000...... $1035 . plus 7.5% of excess over $20,000.
$30,000 to 50,000...... $1785. plus 9.0% of excess over $30,000.
Over $50,000............$3585. plus 10.5% of excess over $50,000.
All revenue derived from the income tax is deposited into the 
state general fund.
Despite the unpopularity of income taxes, the progressive 
nature makes it more politically acceptable when compared with 
the regressive nature of the sales tax. A progressive tax is one 
in which the tax rate increases as one's income increases. This
20
is based on the economic principle of ability to pay which 
contends "that the tax burden should be geared directly to one's 
income and wealth."46 However, not everyone applauds the nature 
of the income tax. Critics maintain that the tax penalizes 
industrious persons since they must pay for their success with 
higher taxes. That notwithstanding, it is unlikely that North 
Dakota will ever deviate from this important source of revenue.
Legislator Description
The Finance and Tax Committee of the House of Representa­
tives consisted of 17 members during the 1987 legislative 
session. Of the 17, ten were Republican and seven were Democrat.
This committee is a standing committee and like other 
committees it serves a crucial function in the legislature 
because it is in committees where real legislative work is 
accomplished. There is simply no way that the legislature could 
conceivably study the hundreds of bills brought before it in the 
legislative session. To facilitate its workload, all bills are 
assigned to committees and it is there where a recommendation is 
made after careful thought and deliberation.
Malcolm Jewell has stated that state legislative committees 
are inferior to their congressional counterparts. Among the 
reasons given were inadequate staff assistance, high turnover, 
and the limited amount of time the legislature meets. On the 
face of it, Jewell's observations could describe the North Dakota 
legislature. However, even though this state's legislative 
committees meet only a few months every two years, they are aided
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tremendously by the Legislative Council. This council directs 
studies requested by the legislature between sessions and these 
studies are conducted by committees composed of several legisla­
tors. In addition, the council has a staff of attorneys, 
accountants, and researchers "to provide a continuing... service 
to legislators, to draft bills and amendments for legislators and 
committees, to revise state laws and to serve as a staff for 
the...legislature. "47
The full chamber of the House of Representatives consisted 
of 106 members. In the 1987 session, 61 were Republican and 45 
were Democrat.
The following chapter discusses the measures employed to 
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As stated in the introduction, the primary purpose of this 
study is to determine the extent of party voting on House finance 
and tax legislation. This will be accomplished by a study of 
roll call votes at the committee level. A consideration of 
partisan influence on the final outcome of the bills in the House 
will also be considered.
North Dakota is one of the few states where every bill 
introduced is given a committee hearing, reported out, and 
finally voted on by the full chamber. Since the influence of a 
party cannot kill a bill in committee, a study of roll call votes 
yields a more accurate picture of party activity than in most 
states. Since the concept of party loyalty or party competition 
is not directly observable, it is necessary to specify the 
operationalization of the concept. The process of operation­
alization "makes it possible for scientists to agree on what they 
observe and therefore accumulate knowledge about the empirical 
world.1,1
The operationalization of party voting among legislators 
will be determined in the following manner. The level of party 
competition on the roll calls will exist when one-half or more of
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the members of one party vote against one-half or more of the 
members of the other party. This is the operational definition 
of party voting or partisan alignment. For purposes of this 
study, consideration will be given to the final roll call from 
the committee; i.e., the bill as it is ultimately referred to the 
full house chamber. The universe contains the total votes 
examined in this study. Absent votes have not been included in 
the index computation.
The Rice Index of Cohesion will be used to measure the 
extent of party cohesion thus identifying issues which may elicit 
a party-orientated response. The Rice Index is used for 
measuring a political party's cohesion among roll call votes.
This index was named after its inventor, sociologist Stuart A. 
Rice. Rice defined cohesion "as the extent to which the distri­
bution of voters on a legislative roll call deviates from the 
distribution that would be expected if all influences operated in 
a random fashion."2 Thus, the index enables a researcher to 
study the degree of voting unity displayed within a party. It is 
computed by "converting the number of 'yeas' and 'neas' into 
percentages of the total number of group members voting."2 The 
absolute difference between the two percentages is then taken.
The index has a range from zero to 100. A score of 100 indicates 
that all members of a party vote on one side of an issue while a 
score of zero indicates that members of a party are evenly 
divided. Any Rice Index score greater than zero indicates that 
more than 50 percent of the party members voted together.
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In this study, the author has consistently subtracted the 
percent against value from the percent for value when computing 
the percentage measure on each bill. Therefore there are times 
when a figure may be negative. The Rice index traditionally 
expresses the absolute difference between the two percentages 
indicating that a positive value will be obtained. However, for 
purposes of clarity, the author has chosen to express the 
negative value when it occurs since this will indicate that a 
party voted against a bill in the majority. Similarly, a 
positive value indicates that the opposing party voted for the 
bill in the majority. This method will clearly show that the 
operational definition of party voting is met since it will 
reveal that sizable majorities of both parties opposed each other 
on a particular vote.
It is expected that an analysis of the data will yield 
information to support the contention that political factors 
shape the outcome of finance and tax legislation. The result of 
these factors is of importance to the public bureaucracy in that 
the funding for public policies is conditional upon the allo­
cation of funds by the legislative branch.
The House Finance and Tax Committee heard a total of 92 
bills which were then voted on by the full house chamber.
However, 72 of these bills failed to constitute my operational 
definition of party voting which was when one-half or more of the 
members of one party vote against one-half or more of the members 
of the other party. In other words, these 72 bills never had a
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majority of Democrats voting against a majority of Republicans. 
Nevertheless, for purposes of comparison, a brief synopsis of 
these issues will prove helpful in determining what tax issues 
elicit partisan responses. A more complete description of these 
bills is given in the appendix.
The 72 bills which show an absence of party voting encompass 
numerous areas of taxation. These areas can be broken down into 
the following rough categories:
1. The sales tax; e.g., vending machine sales tax.
2. General taxation; e.g., aircraft excise tax, 
copyrights, mobile home tax, gasoline tax.
3. Income tax; e.g., interest on overpayment, 
employee withholding.
4. Coal conversion tax; e.g., tax rate.
5. Estate tax
6. Miscellaneous; e.g., insurance premium tax, budget 
stabilization fund.
7. Oil extraction tax; e.g., reduction in rate.
8. Oil and gas production tax; e.g., oil and gas 
development impact fund.
9. Property tax
10. Use tax; e.g., alcohol tax increase.
It is clear from the above information that the majority of 
tax issues are not partisan in nature. As will be seen shortly, 
the role of party on tax issues is confined to a rather select 
number of areas.
Table 2 gives the Rice Index of Cohesion measures for the 20 
remaining bills that were partisan aligned at the committee
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level. The table also gives the index measure for the bills as 
they were voted on by the full House chamber.
Table 2
Index of Cohesion




1062 -100.0% 80.0% -100.0% 96.4%
1064 -100.0% 100.0% - 36.4% 100.0%
1065 42.8% - 20.0% 59.0% 86.2%
1070 -100.0% 80.0% - 95.4% 83.3%
1193 - 14.2% 20.0% 100.0% 100.0%
1229 80.0% - 66.6% 4.8% - 93.4%
1274 - 14.2% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
1346 -100.0% 100.0% - 81.9% 96.6%
1496 - 33.4% 60.0% - 54.6% 28.8%
1581 - 14.2% 100.0% 33.3% - 86.0%
1600 -100.0% 100.0% - 90.4% - 73.0%
1611 -100.0% 100.0% 63.6% - 79.8%
1645 - 14.2% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
1667 -100.0% 100.0% - 67.4% 96.6%
1676 100.0% - 75.0% - 87.0% 86.4%
2286 - 20.0% 100.0% - 17.0% - 96.5%
2351 - 20.0% 100.0% - 86.7% - 93.1%
2406 - 60.0% 100.0% 77.2% 100.0%
2496 -100.0% 100.0% 40.5% - 96.5%
2558 - 42.8% 100.0% 7.7% - 96.4%
Average: 62.8% 85.0% 65.1% 89.5%
Upon examination of the table, it is interesting to note 
that out of these 20 bills, only six were unanimously partisan 
aligned (1064, 1346, 1600, 1611, 1667, and 2496). On these 
bills, each party had an index measure of 100 indicating complete 
unity in voting albeit on opposite sides of the issue. These six 
bills embodied four areas of taxation: The corporate income tax,
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one aspect of the sales tax, the coal severance tax, and the oil 
extraction tax.
The remaining 14 bills at the committee level are partisan 
aligned but at varying levels of unity. Malcolm Jewell has 
suggested a useful, although arbitrary measure of a party vote.
He states that a roll call is a partisan vote if the parties take 
opposite sides and there is a high index of cohesion, "such as 80 
or 60."4 it is felt by the author that this study will be 
enhanced if a higher index measure is employed to determine a 
party vote since the measure that was previously used is not as 
strong an indicator. Therefore, an index measure of 80 or higher 
will now signify a party vote. With that in mind, House bills 
1062 and 1070 are party votes in addition to the six bills 
previously mentioned which are unanimously partisan aligned. HB 
1062 relates to the income tax and 1070 again relates to the 
corporate income tax.
When we consider the full house chamber, there is a drop in 
the incidence of party voting. Previously, eight bills were 
partisan aligned. Now, only four remain (1062, 1070, 1346, and 
1676). 1676 became a party vote when it was voted on by the 
house chamber. The subject of this bill was the state income 
tax.
To recapitulate, the following tax areas together with their 
respective bill numbers are considered partisan issues and fall 
under five categories:
1. The corporate income tax; 1064, 1070.
2. The state income tax; 1062, 1676.
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3. The sales tax; 1611.
4. The coal severance tax; 2496.
5. The oil extraction tax; 1346, 1600, 1667.
In Chapter 3 an exploration of the possible factors which 
may explain the incidence of party voting will be given. The 
hypothesis that partisan factors shape the outcome of finance and 
tax legislation will be evaluated. Finally, an analysis of party 
competition in the North Dakota legislature and its effect upon 
public finance and taxation policies will be explored. That is, 
does the competitiveness of North Dakota's political parties 
cause our political system to differ in its approach to public 
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In the past, North Dakota was a one-party Republican state. 
Currently, it can be considered two-party with the Republican 
party dominating.1 If North Dakota were not a two-party state, 
an analysis of party voting would be meaningless since "an 
absolute prerequisite for party voting is the existence of two 
parties in the legislature."2 Yet, it is still unclear if we can 
assume that party alignments are prevalent in the North Dakota 
legislature. As Jewell and Patterson further comment, "...states 
that have the strongest party alignments on roll calls are 
generally the ones that have had strong statewide party competi­
tion for a long time."2 We cannot conclude, however, that North 
Dakota has had strong party competition for a long time. Indeed, 
Lloyd Omdahl notes that this state has had a two-party system 
only since 1956 and the Republican party continues to dominate.4
That notwithstanding, a study of some of the taxation issues 
before the House Finance and Tax Committee clearly shows a 
certain degree of party competitiveness. Following is a brief 
description of the contents of the eight bills which had an index 
measure of 80 or greater at the committee level. The index 
measure on HB 1676 was not this high at. the committee level.
However, it is included in this discussion since the measure 
increased when the bill reached the House, indicating a greater 
partisan split. A discussion of the possible causes of the 
partisan nature of the bills will be noted in addition to an 
evaluation, where applicable, of how closely these factors relate 
to previous studies of legislative research as given in the 
literature review.
HR 1062. This bill relates to the disclosure by the tax 
department of the filing status of a taxpayer's income tax 
return. Before the passage of this bill, the law allowed the tax 
department to disclose if a taxpayer had not filed. Currently, 
the law prohibits any disclosure regarding the filing status of 
an income tax return.
HB 1064. This bill allows apportioning corporations to use 
the water's edge unitary combination approach to apportion income 
for purposes of the corporate income tax. The water's edge 
method is an approach to unitary taxation that is recognized by 
the North Dakota Tax Department. Corporations under a water's 
edge group include the following entities:
a. Any affiliated corporation incorporated in the 
United States...
b. Domestic international sales corporations...
c. Export trade corporations.
d. Foreign corporations deriving gain or loss from a 
disposition of a United States real property 
interest.
e. Any corporation incorporated outside the United 
States if over fifty percent of its voting stock is 
owned directly or indirectly by the taxpayer and if 
more than twenty percent of the average of its 
payroll and property is assignable to a location 
within the United States.5
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HB 1070. This legislation requires the tax commissioner to
report on a quarterly basis to the budget section of the Legisla­
tive Council on corporate income tax collections and outstanding 
corporate income tax liability. However, this bill failed to 
become law as it was defeated in the Senate.
HB 1346. The subject of this bill is the state's oil 
extraction tax. This bill would have eliminated the six and one- 
half percent tax on January 1, 1989 and would have increased the 
oil and gas production tax to eight and one-half percent on that 
date. However, this bill the Senate refused to accept.
HB 1600. This bill again relates to the oil extraction tax. 
It would have exempted from the tax, oil from enhanced recovery 
operations. The term "enhanced oil recovery" means to recover 
oil from a reservoir by using artificial methods such as 
injecting gas or fluids into a reservoir. The bill lost in the 
House of Representatives.
HB 1611. This bill would have reduced the deduction from 
sales tax collections which retailers are allowed to take for 
administrative expenses. However, the bill lost in the House.
HB 1667. This bill provides for an exemption from the oil 
extraction tax for 24 months for extension and development wells 
and 48 months for wildcat wells after completion of drilling on 
the well. Since this bill affected the initiated measure voters 
approved in 1980, it needed a two-thirds majority vote to pass.
It failed to achieve this in the House.
36
HB 1676. This bill increased the state individual short
form income tax rate to 15 percent. However, the bill failed to 
pass when it reached the Senate.
SB 2496. The subject of this legislation was the coal 
severance tax. It was very hard to achieve a consensus on the 
rate reduction and the allocation of the tax collection. The 
bill passed the Senate but failed in the House. However, both 
parties resurrected the issue near the end of the session.
Causes of Party Competition
HB 1062 is the only bill which remained heavily partisan 
throughout the legislative session. As will be discussed 
shortly, the majority of bills categorized as partisan in this 
study failed to be passed by both chambers. HB 1062 provides an 
excellent example of a strictly partisan area. A brief history 
of events preceding the bill is in order. During the 1984 
reelection campaign for governor, it was revealed that Governor 
Allen Olson (R) had not filed an income tax return. This was 
consistent with a North Dakota law allowing such a disclosure. 
This came at a time very close to his reelection bid. Governor 
Olson subsequently lost the election to his opponent, Democrat 
George Sinner. One could speculate that this disclosure cost the 
Republican Olson the gubernatorial bid. This disclosure embar­
rassed the state Republican party. Therefore, the 1987 session 
passed a bill to prohibit any disclosure of information regarding 
income tax filing status. The disclosure clearly involved the 
party interest and is consistent with Jewell's findings on one
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aspect of partisan issues; that is, "those [issues] which involve 
rather narrow party interests..."^
The subject of corporate taxation embodied in HB 1064 
provides another good example of a partisan issue. The bill 
allows corporations to employ the water's edge unitary combina­
tion approach for purposes of the corporate income tax. This 
method gives apportioning corporations a tax break. The 
Republicans favored this because they felt that this would 
provide an incentive for these corporations to continue doing 
business in the state, thus providing more jobs and industry. As 
one Democratic legislator told the author, many Democrats 
objected to allowing such corporations to receive a tax break 
while the domestic corporations (ones confined to this state) did 
not have this privilege.
The Democratic party may have thought of this issue as 
affecting the prestige and success of their party and that of the 
governor's administration due to the fact that the state's tax 
department estimated a decrease to the state's general fund in 
the amount of $500,000 for the 1987-89 biennium. More important­
ly however is the fact that this loss is expected to grow from $6 
to $7.6 million in the 1989-91 biennium due to this tax!
It is not clear why the bills relating to the severance 
taxes (oil and coal) were partisan in nature. Since this issue 
ceased to be partisan near the end of the session, other factors 
which will be discussed later helped to explain the vote pattern.
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There was no clear reason why HB 1070 resulted in a partisan 
vote; however, it did relate to state government administra­
tion, an issue recognized as sensitive to party pressure. As 
Jewell notes, "Although roll-call studies have seldom identified 
precisely the bills on which governors were committed, they have 
shown that party cohesion is usually high on certain kinds of 
issues that almost automatically involve the governor's pres­
tige."7 Jewell contends these issues include taxation bills and 
bills affecting state government administration. An aspect of 
the sales tax, HB 1611, related to the deduction retailers are 
allowed for administrative expenses. The bill would have reduced 
this deduction. Again, this relates to state government 
administration but the author could not find a clear reason why 
it was partisan aligned in committee. Indeed, when the bill was 
voted on by the House, the partisan split fell below 80.
The last bill to be considered under causes of party 
competition is HB 1676. This Republican sponsored bill would 
have increased the state income tax rate to 15 percent of federal 
liability. An additional factor added to the partisan tone of 
this bill. The Democratic party, with the support of the 
governor, introduced HB 1670. This legislation would have 
changed the state income tax rate from ten and one-half percent 
of federal liability to a rate of between 1.65% and 5.775% of 
federal taxable income. The tax computed in this form would have 
raised approximately the same amount as the ten and one-half 
percent of federal liability. It was believed that people would
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perceive this tax as less burdensome since it employed a smaller 
number than ten and one-half percent. According to the Democrat­
ic legislator who sponsored the bill, the main advantage to using 
this method was the fact that the state would no longer be 
subject to whatever tax changes are made at the federal level.
This is because the state tax would be based on a percentage of
federal taxable income rather than federal liability.
Recall that this study has only considered bills that were 
referred out of committee in a partisan manner. HB 1670 came out 
of the committee without a recommendation by its members and the 
vote was unanimous. In this manner they left it up to the House 
chamber to resolve. There the bill was defeated in a partisan 
manner. This relates to Jewell and Patterson's observations on
party issues. As they put it, "... the administration party is
more likely to unite on measures that involve the governor's 
prestige; for political reasons, the opposition party is also 
more likely to unite on such issues."®
The Republican sponsored bill, 1676, was voted on by the 
House soon after HB 1670. However, there were enough Republicans 
who voted against the bill; therefore, it too lost. There were 
many legislators from both parties who felt uncomfortable about 
voting for the tax increase since this issue was to be decided by 
the people in the March special election. This election resulted 
from the voter's referral of the increase in the individual state 
income tax rate which was approved by the December special 
session.
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Although it appears that political factors have shaped some 
rather important taxation issues in the state, a closer look 
yields some surprising findings. In the next two sections, an 
evaluation of the hypothesis that partisan influences shape the 
outcome of finance and tax legislation will be considered.
A discussion of party competitiveness and its impact on North 
Dakota public policy making will follow.
Partisan Influence
On the face of it, it would appear that the previous nine 
bills have elicited a partisan response since they exhibited a 
high index of cohesion (80 or greater). However, it is important 
to realize that seven of these nine bills failed to be passed by 
both chambers which is essential in order for the bill to become 
law. This does not mean that the issues were dead. Indeed, 
there were other bills that were introduced which related to the 
tax areas that have been described. Referring to Table 2, these 
bills included 1065, 1193, 1274, 1645, and 2406, in addition to 
1062 and 1064. These were the only bills out of the original 20 
which survived the session. All but two went through a confer­
ence committee implying that, in the end, the bill was acceptable 
to both parties. A further look at the table indicates that the 
level of partisanship on these bills has greatly diminished. 
Indeed, only HB 1062 can still be considered a party vote 
according to the method that was employed.
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An analysis of the above data shows that the hypothesis 
concerning partisan influence over finance and tax legislation 
has not been confirmed. Even when voting on tax issues followed 
party lines at the committee level, it switched, by and large, to 
a bipartisan effort when it came to a vote on the final passage 
of the bill in the House chamber. It appears that, even though 
the parties disagreed on certain aspects of the bill, they see 
the need to compromise on its final passage. This seems to 
indicate a concept of a time frame; that is, partisanship tends 
to decrease as the legislative session winds down. What does 
this say about the role of party in relation to public finance 
tax policy?
Partisanship and Public Policy
The central question to be addressed is what difference does 
it make in public policy whether a state is characterized as two- 
party or exhibits little party competition? Does the two-party 
nature of North Dakota politics cause the state to differ in its 
approach to public tax policies from a state where only one party 
dominates? This is a question that is not easy to answer.
Years ago, V.O. Key advanced a thesis that a competitive 
party system would lead to more liberal policies in such areas as 
welfare and taxation while one-partyism strengthened conservative 
views. However, Jack M. Treadway correctly observes that Key's 
work was confined to the South which is noncompetitive. Treadway 
concludes that "Key apparently did not intend for his findings to 
be extended to more competitive states."9
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Fortunately, there have been other researchers who have gone 
beyond the non-competitive states. Their findings shed some 
light on the role of the political system in the formulation of 
policy. Following are the views of Sarah McCally Morehouse and 
Thomas R. Dye who present two opposing viewpoints on this 
subject.
Morehouse
Sarah McCally Morehouse contends that political factors such
as states having a strong governor and competitive parties will
be more effective at determining redistributive policies.
Redistributive policies are relevant to tax policy since taxes
are needed to finance this type of policy. Morehouse also offers
evidence to support Key's proposition that policies benefiting
the have-nots will result from states having strong parties. The
conclusion of her study provides a good summation of her beliefs
and is worth quoting at length:
It is true that the degree of industrialization in a 
state influences the needs and demands of its citizens.
If the state has reached an advanced post industrial 
condition, the quality of education may be higher and 
the smaller numbers of poor may be better cared for.
The analyses in this book have taken these factors into 
consideration by testing all variables in relationship 
to each other. It is true that the wealth, education, 
and communication systems that exist in a state give 
rise to demands for political leadership and the formal 
powers and services to make it effective. In all 
cases, however, the economic conditions of a state have 
had less effect on the redistributive services than the 
combination of the political party and the political 
structures within which the party operates.10
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Dye
In contrast to Morehouse, Thomas Dye asserts that environ­
mental (including economic) variables, not political, are 
preeminent in the policymaking process.
Dye acknowledges that many political scientists have long 
subscribed to the belief that political factors shape public 
policymaking in the states. These factors or variables included, 
among others, the level of interparty competition and which party 
controlled the state government. However, "When these assertions 
were tested...it turned out that there were few significant 
independent relationships between party competition and levels of 
public taxing and spending in the American states. 1,11
Indeed, Dye has found that there are "good a priori reasons 
for believing that the state parties do not pursue markedly 
different tax policies when they occupy state offices."12 In his 
study, Dye examined 54 policy measures which he termed system 
characteristics and related them to party competition. Employing 
partial correlation analysis, it was found that there were few 
significant independent relationships between party competition 
and a state's reliance on different types of taxation policies. 
Once the effects of a state's level of economic development were 
controlled, the association between competitive politics and 
public taxation policies largely disappeared. Party competition 
as well as a state's tax policy are dependent upon levels of 
economic development. Therefore, any association between
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competitive politics and tax policies is spurious. Or, as Dye 
explains:
Economic development shapes both political systems and 
policy outcomes, and most of the association that 
occurs between system characteristics and policy 
outcomes can be attributed to the influence of economic 
development. Differences in the policy choices of 
states with different types of political systems turn 
out to be largely a product of differing socioeconomic 
levels rather than a direct product of political 
variables,13
The reader will note that Dye examined 54 policy measures. 
The issues examined covered other areas besides taxation.
Clearly, taxation policy is not equivalent to all policy. Yet 
Dye argues that these policy areas collectively show that the 
influence of party on public policies, including taxation, is not 
direct. He goes on to state that "Democratic or Republican 
control of a state government is not a good predictor of state 
policy outcomes."14 This is due to the fact that neither party 
offers consistent programs from state to state. He forcefully 
concludes that
the state parties are more products of their constitu­
encies than they are molders of them. Socioeconomic 
conditions in a state appear to be much more influen­
tial in determining policy outcomes than the party 
which is in control of the state government... and it is 
difficult to discover any independent effect of party 
affiliation upon public policy.1^
If these findings are more accurate than the research of 
Sarah McCally Morehouse, we could conceivably discount the 
importance of political parties on state government. This in no 
way should diminish' the importance of the political science 
discipline. As Dye persuasively argues:
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A more balanced view, of course, is that political 
science derives its importance from what it seeks to 
explain-public policy. The important thing to achieve 
is the most effective and efficient explanation of 
policy outcomes. If economic or other environmental 
variables explain public policy more clearly than 
political variables, so much the better. The object is 
to explain public policy, and not to assert the primacy 
of politics or economics in determining policy 
outcomes.^
The conclusion will be concerned with evaluating the role of 
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The original hypothesis of this paper was that political 
factors shape the outcome of North Dakota finance and tax policy. 
However, evidence of the actual influence of party on these 
measures was noticeably lacking. Clearly, there was another 
factor at work.
Looking back to Table 1, we see that the state's revenue 
from severance taxes is the third most important source, after 
the sales and corporate/individual income tax. In the past, the 
increasing price of oil caused the severance tax to become a 
major part of state financing. In the 1981-83 biennium, it was 
the state's second largest source comprising 24 percent of the 
state general fund. Similarly, during the 1985-87 biennium this 
tax amounted to 22 percent of the state general fund. However, 
due to the effects of the world-wide oil glut, the price of oil 
fell. North Dakota's oil industry was hit hard. As Table 1 
reveals, estimates for the 1987-89 biennium are that the sever­
ance tax will account for only 11 percent of the state's reve­
nues. This dramatic 100 percent drop in oil revenue as a 
percentage of the state general fund "was a major reason for the 
fiscal problems of the 1987 legislative session."2
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The drop in oil revenue to the state represents an aspect of 
economic development. Recall that Thomas Dye found that the 
levels of economic development in a state were more influential 
than political influence in the determination of policy, 
including tax. Although we cannot emphatically state that Dye's 
findings apply to North Dakota, there are remarkable similari­
ties. The state's economic development was severely retarded and 
party voting (political influence) on bills relating to the 
severance tax clearly diminished. Even though these issues 
exhibited party voting initially, the lawmakers saw the need to 
compromise when the bill reached the full House since the 
economic forecast for the state was not good.
The coal severance tax bill provides a good example of the 
need for the lawmakers to compromise on this issue thereby 
alleviating the fiscal problems of the state's coal and oil 
region. Two bills were introduced that dealt with the coal 
severance tax, 1065 and 2496. Both parties agreed that the rate 
needed to be lowered but each bill had a different rate for the 
coal tax. Additionally, there was disagreement regarding the 
allocation of the revenue from this tax. HB 1065 placed the tax 
rate at 95 cents per ton while the other bill, 2496, placed the 
rate at 85 cents per ton. In the end, it was agreed that the 
rate would be 75 cents per ton and there would be a change in the 
revenue distribution formula. The formula is given on page 17.
It is interesting to note that when the initial vote was taken on 
the issue, the level of partisanship was still quite high (see
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bill 2496 in the House column of Table 2). The bill was then
defeated. However, when the issue was again taken up at a later
date we see that the final vote on HE 1065 displays a majority of
both parties agreeing with each other (see House column).
This finding is not to say that political variables have no
relevancy. In fact, Dye concedes this in his research:
We are not really justified in concluding... that 
political variables do not have any impact on public 
policy in the states. We can only say that partisan­
ship, party competition,...do not appear to be as 
influential as economic development in determining most 
of the policy outcomes we have mentioned.3
The fiscal problems during the 1987 legislative session
presented lawmakers with several dilemmas. They were not alone
in this. Governor George Sinner called a special session in
December of 1986 to deal with a projected $27 million deficit in
the state general fund. This was consistent with his role as
policy initiator. The result of this special session was for the
legislature to increase the state income tax. However, this
increase was referred to the people. A referendum can be
described as "a device by which the electorate must approve
decisions of the legislature before these become law..."4 a
special election was held during the legislative session and
voters narrowly approved the tax hike.
The legislature still needed to raise other taxes and sales
tax bills were introduced. There was considerable disagreement
in the Republican caucus on which course the legislature should
take. The House Majority Leader favored expanding the sales tax
base to include more taxable items while others in his caucus
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were adamantly opposed to this and favored increasing the sales 
tax rate on existing items. As one member of the caucus told the 
author, the majority leader never asked his caucus to take a 
position. Instead, the purpose of the caucus was to obtain a 
consensus on an issue. Evidently, the role of the House party 
leader was not to force his way on members of his Republican 
caucus. Due to the extreme importance of this issue, the caucus 
members were given latitude in the hope of arriving at a decision 
that the majority of the members could feel comfortable with.
This fact poses an interesting insight concerning the role of 
party in North Dakota. Since caucus members are given this 
freedom, the party may not be so strong in its influence over 
finance and tax legislation.
In the end, the sales tax rate was increased to five and 
one-half percent and the sales tax base was expanded to include a 
tax on cable television. This was expected to add $46.1 million 
to the general fund. This amending of cable television into the 
sales tax bill was perhaps done out of desperation as it occurred 
in the final days of the session. That notwithstanding, the 
North Dakota Cable TV Association successfully referred this tax 
by obtaining well over the required 13,054 signatures necessary 
to refer an action by the legislature. This represents a 
significant loss since "that tax was expected to add...$3.2 
million to the state general fund."5
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SUMMATION
The result of this study presents some interesting findings 
concerning the role of party in finance and tax legislation and 
the impact on public policy.
First, it is evident that the majority of tax issues before 
the North Dakota legislature fail to cause significant partisan 
divisions. When they do it is confined to a select number of 
areas such as the severance taxes and aspects of the corporate 
income tax. These issues start out as partisan in tone when they 
are considered by the finance and tax committee. However, as 
time progresses and the session winds down, the lawmakers appear 
to relinquish their partisan hold. Thus, compromises are 
structured to the point where both sides are satisfied and the 
issues can pass in the full House.
Second, this finding concerning the role of party on tax 
issues reveals that, for the most part, the impact of partisan­
ship on North Dakota policy does not cause policy outputs to vary 
in the extreme. There is a great effort to compromise at the 
end, especially when the state's fiscal condition depends on it. 
Therefore, we can state that a margin of stability is provided to 
the state - a stability that should not cause public agencies 
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A P P E N D I X
B i l l  # Topi c  Committee vote Committee d i v i s i o n House
*HB 1062 Income tax f i l i n g 9-7 For : Goetz ,  Anderson,  B e l t e r , 59-44
d i s c l o s u r e Hanson, Haugen, M ar t i n ,  Moore,  
Olson,  T o l l e f s o n
A g s t : Hausauer,  DeMers, Linderman,  R ie h l ,
Tomac, Watne, Wi l l i am s
*HB 1064 Corporate  income tax 10-7 For : Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  
B e l t e r ,  Hanson, Haugen, M ar t in ,  
Moore,  T o l l e f s o n
70-30
A g s t : DeMers, Linderman,  R i e h l ,  Schne ider ,
Tomac, Watne, Wi l l i am s
*HB 1065 Coal  severance tax 9-8 For : Hausauer,  Anderson,  DeMers,  
Haugen, M ar t in ,  Schne ider ,  Tomac, 
Watne, Wi l l i ams
81-14
A g s t : Goetz ,  B e l t e r ,  Hanson, Linderman,  
Moore,  Olson,  R i e h l ,  T o l l e f s o n
*HB 1070 Corporate  income tax 9-6 For : Hausauer,  Goetz,  B e l t e r ,  Hanson,  
Haugen, M ar t in ,  Moore, Olson,  
T o l l e f s o n
56-48
A g s t : Anderson,  DeMers, Linderman,  R ie h l ,
Sc hne ider ,  Watne
HB. 1074 E x h i b i t i o n  spor t s  tax 15-1 For : Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson, 100-5
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, Haugen, 
L inderman , M ar t in ,  Moore, Olson,  
R i e h l , S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n ,  Watne, 
W i l l i a m s  
A g s t : Tomac
Note: An * denotes a p a r t i s a n  a l i g ne d  b i l l .
Democrats are underscored.
DNP means a do not pass recommendation.
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W/0 Rec. means that  the committee took  
no a c t i o n  on the b i l l .
HB 1103 S e t o f f  of income tax 14-0
refunds DNP
HB 1115 A g r i c u l t u r a l  f u e l  tax 14-0
inc rease  DNP
HB 1192 Insurance premium tax 14-3
inc rease
*HB 1193 O i l  & gas p roduc t ion  9-8
tax
HB 1195 O u t - o f - s t a t e  tax 16-0
c o l l e c t i o n  *
*HB 1229 P a y r o l l  i n fo r ma t io n  10-6





F o r :
A g s t :
For :
For : 
A g s t :
Hausauer,  Goetz ,  Anderson  
Hanson, Haugen, L inderman ,
Moore, Olson,  Ri  e h l , S c h n e i d e r , 
T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac, Watne, Wi l l iams
Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  1-103
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Haugen, L inderman, 
Moore, Olson,  R i e h l , T o l l e f s o n ,
Tomac, Watne, W i l l i am s
Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  82-13
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, Haugen, 
L inderman, M a r t i n ,  Moore,  Olson,
R i e h l , S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n  
Tomac, Watne, Wi11 jams
Goetz,  Anderson,  Hanson, 103-0
Haugen, M ar t i n ,  R i e h l , T o l l e f s o n ,
Tomac, Watne
Hausauer,  B e l t e r ,  DeMers , L inderman, 
Moore, Olson,  S c h n e i d e r , W i l l iams
Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  103-1
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, Haugen, 
L inderman, Moore, Ol son,  R i e h l , 
S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac, Watne, 
W i l l i am s
Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  24-79
B e l t e r ,  Hanson, Haugen, Mar t in ,
Moore,  Olson,  Tomac
DeMers, L inderman, R i e h l , T o l l e f s o n ,  
Watne, Wi l l i am s
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HB 1238 Use taxes on 14-2
designated s e r v i c e s
HB 1240 Corporate  i n t e r e s t  13-1
payments
HB 1246 L ie ns ,  pena l ty ,  and 13-4
dea le r  l i c e n s e  fees  DNP
HB 1258 F e d e r a l i z a t i o n  date fo r  17-0
income taxes
HB 1259 Corporate  income tax 15-0
HB 1260 Late payment i n t e r e s t  16-1
rate
For :
A g s t : 
F o r :
A g s t : 
For :




A g s t :
Hausauer,  Goetz ,  Anderson,  49-55
B e l t e r ,  Hanson, Haugen, L inderman, 
M a r t i n ,  Moore, Ol son,  R i e h l ,
S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n ,  Wi l l iams  
Tomac, Watne
Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  104-0
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, L inderman,
Moore, O l son,  R i e h l , T o l l e f s o n ,
Tomac, Watne, Wi l l i ams  
Haugen
Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  8-93
B e l t e r ,  Hanson, L inderman,
M a r t i n ,  Moore,  S c h n e id e r ,
T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac, Watne, Wi l l i ams  
DeMers , Haugen, Olson,  R ie h l
Hausauer,  Goetz ,  Anderson,  100-0
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, Haugen, 
L inderman, M ar t in ,  Moore, Olson,
R i e h l , S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac, 
Watne, W i l l i am s
Hausauer,  Goetz ,  Anderson,  99-0
B e l t e r ,  DeMers , Hanson, Haugen, 
L inderman, Moore,  Olson,  R i e h l , 
Schneider  , T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac,
W i l l i am s
Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  97-5
B e l t e r ,  DeMers , Hanson, Haugen, 
L inderman , M ar t i n ,  Moore, Olson,  
R ie h l  , S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n ,
Watne , W i l l i am s  
Tomac
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HB 1261 Federa l  income tax 15-0
deduct ion
HB 1265 Gross value we l l  13-3
d e f i n i t i o n  DNP
*HB 1274 Coal  g a s i f i c a t i o n  by- 12-4
products  exemption
HB 1288 Overpayment of  income tax 16-0
overpayment
HB 1290 Tax refund on compressed 17-0
na tu ra l  gas
HB 1291 Home ru le  c i t y  non- 14-3
re s id e n t  exemption DNP
For :
For :
A g s t : 
For :
A g s t : 
For :
For :
F o r : 
A g s t :
Hausauer,  Goetz ,  Anderson,  103-0
B e l t e r ,  DeMers , Hanson, Haugen, 
L inderman, Moore,  Olson,
S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac.
Watne, W i l l i a m s
Hausauer,  Goetz ,  B e l t e r ,  38-64
DeMers, Haugen, L inderman,
M ar t in ,  Moore,  Olson,  S c h n e i d e r , 
T o l l e f s o n ,  T omac, Wi l l i ams  
Hanson, R i e h l  , Watne
Hausauer,  Goetz ,  B e l t e r ,  98-2
DeMers, Hanson, Haugen,
L inderman, M a r t i n ,  Moore, Olson,
R i e h l , T o l l e f s o n
S c h n e i d e r , Tomac, Watne, Wi l l i am s
Hausauer,  Goetz ,  Anderson,  105-0
B e l t e r ,  DeMers , Hanson, Haugen,  
L inderman, M a r t i n ,  Moore, R ie h l  , 
S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac,
Watne, W i l l  jams
Hausauer,  Goetz ,  Anderson,  104-0
B e l t e r ,  DeMers , Hanson, Haugen,  
L inderman, M a r t i n ,  Moore, Olson,
R i e h l , S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac, 
Watne, W i l l i am s
Hausauer,  Goetz ,  Anderson,  32-72
B e l t e r ,  DeMers , Hanson, Haugen, 
L inderman, Moore, Olson,  S c h n e i d e r , 
T o l l e f s o n ,  Watne, Wi l l i ams  
M ar t i n ,  R i e h l , Tomac
59
HB 1313 Del inquent  mobi le  
home taxes
17-0
HB 1319 Vending machine sa les  17-0
HB 1325 State  estate  tax 17-0
payments
HB 1337 Co nt rac to r  bids  17-0
HB 1341 Income tax l evy  14-3
DNP
*HB 1346 O i l  e x t r a c t i o n  tax 10-7
e l i m i n a t i o n
103-1For:  Hausauer,  Goetz ,  Anderson,
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, Haugen,
L ind erman, M ar t i n ,  Moore, Olson,
R i e h l , S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac, 
Watne, Wi l l i ams
For:  Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  77-0
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, Haugen, 
L inderman, M ar t i n ,  Moore, Olson,
R i e h l , S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac, 
Watne, Wi l l i am s
For:  Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  99-0
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, Haugen, 
L inderman , M a r t i n ,  Moore, Olson,
R i e h l , S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac, 
Watne, Wi l l i am s
For:  Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  101-3
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, Haugen, 
L inderman, M a r t i n ,  Moore, Olson,
R i e h l , S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac, 
Watne, W i l l i am s
For:  Hausauer,  Goetz,  B e l t e r ,  DeMers, 26-74
L inderman , M a r t i n ,  Moore, Olson,
R i e h l , S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n ,
T omac, Watne, Wi l l i ams  
Agst:  Anderson,  Hanson, Haugen
For:  Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  61-41
B e l t e r ,  Hanson, Haugen, Mar t in ,
Moore,  Ol son,  T o l l e f s o n  
Agst:  DeMers , L inderman, R i e h l ,
Schne ider  , Tomac, Watne, Wi l l iams
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HB 1381 Employer 's  income tax 13-4
c r e d i t
HB 1392 Tax exemption fo r  candy, 15-0
soda, and gum DNP
HB 1399 Adjuvants exemption 15-0
HB 1413 Gross value at we l l  14-1
def ined DNP
HB 1453 Royal ty  owners 10-6
commission DNP
HB 1493 Tax c r e d i t  f or  16-0
employers DNP
100-0For:  Anderson,  B e l t e r ,  DeMers ,
Haugen, L inderman, Moore,  Olson,
R i e h l , S c h n e id e r , T o l l e f s o n ,
Tomac, Watne, W i l l i am s  
Agst:  Hausauer,  Goetz,  Hanson, Mart in
For:  Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  2-97
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, Haugen,  
L inderman, Ma r t in ,  Moore,  Olson,
R i e h l , S c h n e id e r , T o l l e f s o n ,  Watne
For:  Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  101-1
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, Haugen, 
L inderman, Ma r t in ,  Moore,  Olson,
R i e h l , S c h n e id e r , T o l l e f s o n ,  Watne
For:  Hausauer,  Goetz,  B e l t e r ,  22-77
Haugen, L inderman, M a r t i n ,  Moore,
Ol son,  R i e h l , Schne ider  , T o l l e f s o n ,
T omac, Watne, W i l l i am s  
A g s t : Hanson
For:  Hausauer,  Goetz,  DeMers , 23-76
Haugen, L inderman, Moore,  Olson,  
S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n ,  W i l l i a m s  
Agst:  Anderson,  B e l t e r ,  Hanson, Mar t in ,
R i e h l , Tomac
For:  Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  2-101
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Haugen, L inderman, 
M a r t i n ,  Moore, Ol son,  R i e h l ,
S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n ,  T omac, Watne, 
W i l l i a m s
61
*HB 1496 Farm machinery r e p a i r/  10-6
replacement exemption
HB 1527 Farm machinery re p a i r/  16-0
replacement exemption W/0
Rec .
HB 1530 Coal  conversion  14-2
f a c i l i t y  tax
HB 1546 Farm machinery gross 10-6
r e c e i p t s  d e f i n i t i o n  DNP
HB 1548 A i r c r a f t  exc i se  tax 17-0
HB 1561 Church supper gross 17-0
r e c e i p t s  exemption
For : Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  
DeMers, Hausen, M a r t i n .  Moore.  
Olson,  Schne ider ,  T o l l e f s o n
48-55
Agst : B e l t e r ,  Hanson, R i e h l ,  Tomac, 
Watne, Wi l l i ams
For : Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, Hausen,  
Linderman,  M ar t i n ,  Moore, Olson.  
R i e h l ,  Schne ider ,  T o l l e f s o n ,  
Watne, Wi l l i ams
15-88
For : Hausauer,  Goetz,  B e l t e r ,
DeMers, Hanson, Hausen, Ma r t in ,
72-6
Moore, Ol son,  Schne ider ,  T o l l e f s o n ,
Tomac, Watne, Wi l l i am s
Agst: L inderman,  R ieh l
For : Hausauer,  Anderson,  B e l t e r ,  
DeMers, M ar t i n ,  Moore, R i e h l ,  
Schne ider ,  T o l l e f s o n ,  Wi l l i ams
59-42
A g s t : Hanson, Hausen, Linderman,  Olson,  
Tomac, Watne
For : Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, Haugen, 
Linderman,  M ar t in ,  Moore, Olson,
98-5
R i e h l ,  Schne ider ,  T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac,
Watne, W i l l i am s
For : Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, Haugen,  
Linderman,  M a r t i n ,  Moore, Olson,  
R i e h l ,  Schne ider ,  T o l l e f s o n ,  
Tomac, Watne, Wi l l i ams
100-0
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*HB 1581 Mobi le  home taxes  13-4
DNP
HB 1590 Personal  p roper ty  tax 15-1 
replacement
HB 1596 Budget s t a b i l i z a t i o n  17-0 
fund
*HB 1600 Enhanced o i l  recovery  10-7 
exemption
*HB 1611 R e t a i l e r  adm. expense 10-7 
deduct ion DNP
HB 1618 A l l o c a t i o n  of  p roper ty  14-3 
taxes DNP
For :
A g s t : 
For :
A g s t : 
For :
For : 
A g s t : 
For : 
A g s t : 
For :
A g s t :
Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  32-67
B e l t e r ,  Hanson, Haugen, L inderman, 
M ar t i n ,  Moore,  O l son,  R i e h l ,
T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac
DeMers, S c h n e i d e r , Watne, Wi l l i ams
Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  93-4
DeMers, Hanson, Haugen, L inderman, 
M ar t i n ,  Moore, Olson,  R i e h l ,
S c h n e id e r , T o l l e f s o n ,  T omac, Watne 
Wi l l iams
Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  102-0
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, Haugen, 
Linderman, M a r t i n ,  Moore, Olson,
R i e h l , S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n ,
T omac, Watne, W i l l i am s
Hausauer,  Goetz ,  Anderson,  73-29
B e l t e r ,  Hanson, Haugen, Ma r t in ,
Moore, Olson,  T o l l e f s o n  
DeMers, L inderman, R i e h l ,
S c h n e i d e r , Tomac, Watne, Wi l l i ams
Hausauer,  Goetz ,  Anderson,  42-61
B e l t e r ,  Hanson, Haugen, Ma r t in ,
Moore, Olson,  T o l l e f s o n  
DeMers, L inderman, R i e h l ,
S c h n e i d e r , Tomac, Watne, Wi l l i ams
Hausauer,  Goetz ,  B e l t e r ,  20-80
DeMers, L inderman, M ar t in ,
Moore, Olson,  R i e h l , S c h n e id e r , 
T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac, Watne, Wi l l i ams  
Anderson,  Hanson, Haugen
63
HB 1619 Corporate  f e d e ra l  17-0
income tax deduct ion DNP
HB 1627 Commercial ly zoned 15-1
proper ty  DNP
HB 1636 Corporate  c r e d i t  15-0
fo r  new indus t ry
HB 1637 New indus t ry  tax 13-3
exemption
HB 1640 Candidate income tax 13-4
d i s c l o s u r e




A g s t : 
For :
For :




A g s t :
Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, Haugen, 
L inderman. M a r t i n ,  Moore, Olson,
R i e h l . S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n ,
T omac, Watne, W i l l i am s
Hausauer,  Goetz,  B e l t e r ,  no vote
DeMers. Hanson, Haugen, L inderman, 
M a r t i n ,  Moore, Ol son,  R i e h l ,
S c h n e i d e r , Tomac, Watne, Wi l l iams  
T o l l e f s o n
Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  100-2
B e l t e r ,  Hanson, Haugen,
L inderman, M a r t i n ,  Moore, Olson,
R i e h l , Schne ider  , T o l l e f s o n ,
T omac, Wi l l i am s
Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  83-12
B e l t e r ,  Hanson, Haugen, Mart in ,
Moore,  Olson,  S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n ,  
Tomac, Watne
L inderman, R ie h l  , W i l l i ams
Hausauer,  Anderson,  B e l t e r ,  80-21
DeMers, Haugen, L inderman,
M a r t i n ,  Moore, R i e h l , S c h n e id e r ,
Tomac, Watne, W i l l  jams
Goetz,  Hanson, O l son,  T o l l e f s o n
Hausauer,  Anderson,  B e l t e r ,  98-3
DeMers, Hanson, Haugen, L inderman, 
M a r t i n ,  Moore, Ol son,  R i e h l ,
T o l l e f  son
S c h n e i d e r , Tomac, Watne, Wi l l iams
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*HB 1667 Wi ldcat  wel l  exemptions 9-7
HB 1668 Motor ve h i c l e  exc i se  17-0
tax
HB 1670 State  income tax 15-0
W/0 
Rec .
*HB 16 76 S t a t e i n c o m e t a x  8-7
W/0 
Rec .
HB 1679 A i r  c a r r i e r  16-0
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  assessment
HB 1685 Gaso l ine  content  
d i s c l o s u r e
12-2
64-37For : 




A g s t : 
For :
For : 
A g s t :
Hausauer,  Anderson, B e l t e r ,
Hanson, Haugen, M a r t i n ,  Moore,
Ol son,  T o l l e f s o n  
DeMers , L inderman, R i e h l ,
Schne ider  , Tomac, Watne, Wi l l i am s
Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  94-6
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, Haugen,  
L inderman , Mar t in ,  Moore,  Olson,
R i e h l , S c h n e id e r , T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac, 
Watne, Wi l l i ams
Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  42-63
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, Haugen,  
L inderman , Moore, O l son,  R i e h l , 
Schneider  , T o l l e f s o n ,  Watne, Wi l l i ams
Anderson,  DeMers, L inderman , 58-47
R i e h l , S c h n e id e r , Tomac, Watne,
W i l l  jams
Hausauer,  Goetz,  B e l t e r ,  Ma r t in ,
Moore,  Olson,  T o l l e f s o n
Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  105-0
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, Haugen,  
L inderman , Mar t in ,  Moore, Olson,
R i e h l , S c h n e id e r , T o l l e f s o n ,
Watne , W i l l i ams
Hausauer,  Anderson, B e l t e r ,  91-7
DeMers , Hanson, Haugen, M ar t i n ,
Moore,  Olson,  S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n ,
T omac
Goetz ,  Linderman
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SB 2050 Venture c a p i t a l  14-0
cor pora t ion
SB 2076 P o l i t i c a l  s u b d i v i s i o n  16-1
tax levy l i m i t a t i o n s
SB 2077 Cha r i t y  exemptions 15-0
removal
SB 2078 New wel l  tax 11-4
exemption
SB 2079 O i l  e x t r a c t io n  tax 15-0
SB 2099 Coal  conversion  tax 14-0
For : Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Haugen, 
Linderman,  Moore, Olson,  R i e h l ,  
Schneider ,  T o l l e f s o n ,  Watne, 
Wi l l i am s
37-63
For : Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, Haugen, 
Linderman,  M ar t in ,  Moore, Olson,  
R i e h l ,  Schne ider ,  T o l l e f s o n ,  
Watne, W i l l i am s
65-37
A g s t : Tomac
For : Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson,  
Linderman,  M ar t i n ,  Moore, Olson,  
R i e h l ,  Schne ider ,  T o l l e f s o n ,  
Tomac, Watne
80-21
For : Hausauer,  Goetz,  B e l t e r ,
Haugen, Linderman,  Moore, Olson,  
R i e h l ,  Schne ider ,  T o l l e f s o n ,  
Wi l l i am s
95-11
A g s t : Anderson,  Hanson, M a r t i n ,  Watne
For : Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,
B e l t e r .  Hanson, Haugen, Linderman,  
M a r t i n .  Moore, Olson,  R i e h l ,
101-5
Schne ider ,  T o l l e f s o n ,  Watne, Wi l l iams
For : Hausauer,  Goetz,  B e l t e r ,
DeMers, Hanson, Haugen, Linderman 
M a r t i n .  Moore, Olson,  R i e h l ,  
Schneider ,  T o l l e f s o n ,  Watne
103-0
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SB 2103 Tobacco products  13-0
tax inc rease
SB 2164 Insurance company 16-0
premium taxes
SB 2169 Nonpro f i t  c o r p o r a t i o n  15-0
name re s e r v a t i o n
SB 2213 Telecommunicat ion s e r v i c e  15-0
and property
SB 2214 Mus ica l  and d ra ma t i ca l  14-0
composi t ions
SB 2216 Tobacco tax ra te  15-0
increase
95-5For:  Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,
B e l t e r ,  Haugen, L inderman,
Moore, Olson,  R i e h l , S c h n e i d e r , 
T o l l e f s o n ,  Wa t n e , Wi l l i ams
For:  Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  104-0
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, Haugen,  
L inderman, M ar t i n ,  Moore, Olson,
R i e h l , S c h n e i d e r , Tomac, Watne,
Wi l l i ams
For:  Hausauer,  Anderson,  B e l t e r ,  103-0
DeMers, Haugen, L inderman, M ar t in ,  
Moore, Olson,  R i e h l , S c h n e i d e r , 
T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac, Watne, Wi l l i ams
For :  Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  102-0
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, L inderman, 
M ar t in ,  Moore, Olson,  R i e h l ,
S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac, Watne
For :  Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  97-0
B e l t e r ,  Hanson, L inderman,
M ar t i n ,  Moore, Olson,  R i e h l ,
S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac, Watne
For:  Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  94-8
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, L inderman, 
M ar t i n ,  Moore, Olson,  R i e h l ,
S c h n e i d e r , Tomac, Watne, Wi l l i ams
67
SB 2217 State  estate  tax 15-0
SB 2263 Food stamp item 15-0
exemption
*SB 2286 Personal  p roper ty  tax 12-3
replacement revenue DNP
SB 2309 Employee w i thho ld ing  15-0
DNP
SB 2343 Corpora t ion  domest ic  17-0
d iv idend ex c lu s io n
*562351 P r i v i l e g e  tax on 12-3
coal  convers ion  DNP
f a c i l i t i e s
For:  Hausauer,  Goetz ,  Anderson,  104-0
B e l t e r ,  Hanson, Haugen, L inderman, 
M ar t i n ,  Moore,  O l son,  S c h n e id e r , 
T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac, Watne, Wi l l iams
For:  Hausauer,  Goetz ,  Anderson,  102-2
B e l t e r ,  Hanson, Haugen, L inderman, 
M ar t i n ,  O l son,  R ie h l  , S c h ne id e r , 
T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac, Watne, Wi l l iams
For:  Hausauer,  Goetz ,  Anderson,  18-81
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, Haugen, 
L inderman, M a r t i n ,  Moore,  Olson,  
T o l l e f s o n
Agst:  R i e h l , Schne ider  , Watne
For:  Hausauer,  Goetz ,  Anderson,  3-100
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, L inderman, 
M ar t i n ,  Moore,  Ol son,  R i e h l ,
S c h n e i d e r , Tomac, Watne, Wi l l iams
For:  Hausauer,  Goetz ,  Anderson,  101-0
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, Haugen, 
L inderman, M a r t i n ,  Moore, Olson,
R i e h l , S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac, 
Watne, W i l l i am s
For:  Hausauer,  Goetz ,  Anderson,  5-98
B e l t e r ,  Hanson, Haugen, Mart in ,
Moore, Ol son,  S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n ,  
Watne
Agst:  DeMers, L inderman, R ie h l
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SB 2385 Tax return  due date 15-0
SB 2393 O i l  & coa l  development 10-5
impact fund DNP
*'SB 2406 Amusement game sa les  9-4
tax
SB 2436 Coal  convers ion tax 15-0
revenue a l l o c a t i o n
SB 2441 A l coho l  beverage p r i c e  16-1
to i n c lu d e  sa les  tax
SB 2465 Regu la t ion  of i n v e n t i o n  11-0
development s e r v i c e s
For : Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,
B e l t e r ,  Hanson, Haugen, Linderman,  
M a r t i n ,  Olson,  R i e h l ,  Schne ider ,  
T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac, Watne, Wi l l i ams
102-0
For : Hausauer,  Goetz,  B e l t e r ,
DeMers , Linderman,  Moore, Olson,  
Schne ider ,  T o l l e f s o n ,  Watne
37-67
A g s t : Anderson,  Hanson, Haugen, M ar t in ,  
R ie h l
For : Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,
B e l t e r ,  Haugen, Linderman,  Moore,  
Olson,  T o l l e f s o n
99-5
A g s t : R i e h l ,  Schne ider ,  Watne, Wi l l i ams
For : Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,
B e l t e r .  Hanson, Haugen, Linderman 
M a r t i n ,  Olson,  R i e h l ,  Schne ider ,  
T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac, Watne, Wi l l i ams
102-0
►
For : Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, Haugen, 
M a r t i n .  Moore, Olson,  R i e h l ,  
Schne ider ,  T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac, 
Watne, Wi l l i ams
97-4
A g s t : Linderman
For : Hausauer,  Anderson, B e l t e r ,  
DeMers, Haugen, Linderman,  
R i e h l ,  Schne ider ,  T o l l e f s o n ,  
Watne, Wi l l i ams
100-0
69
SB 2476 C i t y  lodging and 10-5
res taurant  tax
*SB 2496 Coal  severance tax 10-5
rate  DNP
SB 2549 Fore ign trade zone 13-3
export  of a l c o h o l i c  
beverages
SB 2550 State  income tax rate  15-0
increase  W/0
R ec .
SB 2552 Exemption of farm 14-0
b ids ,  from proper ty  W/0
taxes Rec.
SB 2555 Sales  tax on ca ta lo g  16-1
and mai l  r e t a i l e r s
68-36For : 
A g s t : 
For : 






A g s t :
Hausauer,  Goetz,  DeMer s ,
Haugen, M a r t i n ,  Moore, S c h n e i d e r , 
T o l l e f s o n ,  Watne, W i l l i am s  
Anderson,  Hanson, L inderman, R i e h l , 
Tomac
Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  32-70
B e l t e r ,  Hanson, Haugen, M a r t i n ,
Moore, Olson,  T o l l e f s o n  
DeMer s , L inderman, R i e h l ,
S c h n e i d e r , Watne
Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  100-3
B e l t e r ,  DeMer s , Hanson, Haugen,  
L inderman, Ma r t in ,  Moore, Olson,  
T o l l e f s o n ,  Watne 
Schneider  , Tomac, W i l l i am s
Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  0-105
B e l t e r ,  Hanson, Haugen, L inderman, 
M a r t i n ,  Moore, Olson,  R i e h l ,
S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n ,  Watne,
W i l l i am s
Anderson,  B e l t e r ,  DeMer s , 43-54
L inderman, M ar t i n ,  R i e h l ,
Watne, W i l l i a m s , Hausauer,  Goetz,  
Haugen, Moore,  S c h n e i d e r ,
T o l l e f  son
Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  95-0
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, Hanson, L inderman, 
M a r t i n ,  Moore, Olson,  R i e h l ,
Schne ider  , T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac, Watne,
W i l l i a m s
Haugen
70
SB 2556 Use tax on a l c o h o l i c  16-0
beverages
SB 2557 Motor v e h i c l e ,  motor 13-4
f u e l s ,  and a i r c r a f t  
exc ise  tax
SB 2558 Income tax sur tax  fo r  11-5
the biennium DNP
For :  Hausauer,  Anderson,  B e l t e r ,  97-3
DeMers, Hanson, Haugen, L inderman, 
M a r t i n ,  Moore,  Olson,  R i e h l ,
S c h n e i d e r , T o l l e f s o n ,  Tomac, Watne, 
W i l l i a m s
For :  Hausauer,  Goetz,  Anderson,  75-28
B e l t e r ,  DeMers, L inderman, M ar t i n ,  
Moore, Ol son,  R i e h l , S c h n e i d e r ,
Tomac, Wi l l i am s
Agst :  Hanson, Haugen, T o l l e f s o n ,  Watne
For :  Hausauer,  Anderson,  B e l t e r ,  23-74
Hanson, Haugen, M ar t in ,  Moore,
Olson,  T o l l e f s o n ,  Watne, W i l l i am s  
Agst :  DeMers, L inderman, R i e h l , S c h n e i d e r ,
T omac
71
